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Abstract
Despite claims about the universality of religious belief, whether religiosity scales have the
same meaning when administered inter-subjectively–or translated and applied cross-cul-
turally–is currently unknown. Using the recent “Supernatural Belief Scale” (SBS), we pres-
ent a primer on how to verify the strong assumptions of measurement invariance required
in research on religion. A comparison of two independent samples, Croatians and New
Zealanders, showed that, despite a sophisticated psychometric model, measurement
invariance could be demonstrated for the SBS except for two noninvariant intercepts. We
present a new approach for inspecting measurement invariance across self- and peer-
reports as two dependent samples. Although supernatural beliefs may be hard to observe
in others, the measurement model was fully invariant for Croatians and their nominated
peers. The results not only establish, for the first time, a valid measure of religious super-
natural belief across two groups of different language and culture, but also demonstrate a
general invariance test for distinguishable dyad members nested within the same targets.
More effort needs to be made to design and validate cross-culturally applicable measures
of religiosity.
Introduction
There has, in the past two decades, been burgeoning interest in the scientific study of religion
as a psychological universal. In this time, many testable theories about the cognitive and evolu-
tionary underpinnings of religious belief and behavior have been proposed. It is argued, for
example, that the belief in supernatural agents emerged out of a hypersensitive tendency to
detect agents in our surrounding environments [1, 2] and our ability to impute rich mental
states to agents [3]. These two basic social cognitive processes are thought to lead to teleofunc-
tional reasoning [4, 5]—the promiscuous tendency to perceive purpose in the world—which is
itself a building block of religious belief (e.g., creationist ideas, beliefs about fate). There are also
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motivational accounts of religious belief, such that some basic, pancultural fears—of random-
ness [6] or death [7]—explain our attraction toward religion.
Whatever the substance of these theories of religion, they share in common the assumption
of cross-cultural generalizability. That is, these are not theories about the belief in specific gods,
but in gods in general. Unfortunately, the empirical progress in this nascent cognitive science
of religion has lagged behind its theoretical fecundity, not least because there are limited tools
available for reliably measuring cross-cultural religious beliefs.Most of the available measures
are either deliberately or inadvertently too culturally specific for widespread cross-cultural use
[8, 9]. Furthermore, the most commonly usedmeasures of religiosity tend to be measures of
religious participation (e.g., religious service attendance) or religious orientation—intrinsic,
extrinsic, and quest, for example [10]—rather than measures of individuals’ tendencies to
believe in supernatural entities and events. It was to address this methodological gap that Jong,
Bluemke, and Halberstadt [11] designed the Supernatural Belief Scale (SBS), the items of which
were derived from consulting anthropological texts to ascertain cross-culturally recurring
supernatural beliefs.
The SBS is an attempt to measure an important cognitive aspect of religion: the belief in
supernatural entities and events. Religion itself is a multi-faceted phenomenon. Indeed, schol-
ars have long argued [12–15], the term “religion” unhelpfully lumps together a variety of
related phenomena, including beliefs, behaviours, experiences, and social identities.
This recognition has led to the proliferation of multidimensional measures of religion,
which attempt to capture multiple facets of religion within a single scale. Such measures are
often used uncritically by researchers who treat them as unidimensionalmeasures of general
religiosity [16]. In contrast, the SBS specifically targets supernatural belief; it may therefore be
used alongside measures of spiritual well-being or religious orientation, identity, behavior, and
experience, but should not be confused for a proxy for those aspects of religiosity.
While the SBS may still be more suitable for some religious or cultural contexts (e.g., those
that include worship of high gods) than others, those contexts include the vast majority of the
world’s religious people. Also the SBS is a direct measure of a key theoretical construct in lay
conceptions of “religiosity” and in recent cognitive research of religion, namely the belief in
supernatural entities, which also occurs outside of organized forms of religion [1, 17–19]. Not-
withstandingmore general supernatural beliefs, the SBS represents an essentially unidimen-
sional measure of supernatural beliefs prevalent in the majority of religious world-views. The
assessment is conceptually independent of religious self-categorization and uncontaminated
with religious practices or individual experiences that one may or may not have.
Measuring Trait Supernatural Belief
As alluded to above, there are a number of cross-culturally recurring religious themes, and the
SBS includes the most important, anthropologically constant themes. The scale consists of ten
statements (S1 Table) to which respondents indicate their agreement on Likert scales, with the
midpoint indicating explicit uncertainty or agnosticism. The items pertain to the belief in a
high god (item 1), the belief in good and evil spiritual powers (e.g., angels, demons; items 2 to
4), the belief in a spiritual essence in human beings (e.g., soul; item 5), the belief in a spiritual
realm (item 6), the belief in positive and negative conceptions of the afterlife (e.g., heaven, hell;
items 7 and 8), the belief in inexplicable events (e.g., miracles; item 9), and the belief in spiritual
intermediaries (e.g., prophets; item 10).
As supernatural beliefs come in specific forms, their core themes need to be assessable
across different contexts. The SBS was explicitly designed to be amenable to translation and
cross-cultural adaptation. For example, while the word “soul” was used in the original version,
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for use among urban New Zealanders, the word “atta” or “atman” may be used instead in con-
texts where Pali- or Sanskrit-based religious traditions (e.g., Hinduism, Buddhism) are more
culturally influential. Similarly, while “prophet” was originally used, “shaman” or “medium”
may be preferable in other cultural contexts. Furthermore, single items may be dropped from
the scale in cultures where certain otherwise commonly recurring concepts are conspicuously
absent, without endangering the interpretation of the remainder of the construct (presuming
that psychometric validity still holds). The SBS provides a basic template for a flexible and
cross-culturally adaptable measure of an individual’s tendency to believe in (religious) super-
natural beliefs, which contemporary evolutionary and cognitive scientific studies on religion
take as their primary explanandum.
Hypothesizing a unidimensional structure for supernatural belief, Jong and colleagues [11]
tested eight alternative measurements models (Models M1-M8; see S1–S8 Figs) via a rigorous
confirmatory factor analytic approach (CFA) on the SBS. Across two independent samples as
well as the combined sample, the SBS was shown to have an essentially unidimensional struc-
ture, qualified by a factor for items with negative valence (e.g., evil spirits, negative conceptions
of afterlife), and five content facets (Model M5). The accepted model extracted on average 81%
of the variance from the test items, indicating reliable inter-individual differences of test scores
[20]. The optimally weighted item combination yielded a supernatural belief factor at the latent
level that was assessed almost perfectly reliably, Ow = .95 [21]. Furthermore, average SBS scores
predicted importance of religion to identity (r = .54), and religious service attendance (ρ = .60).
The SBS was also shown to be useful for testing hypotheses about the relationship between
death anxiety and religious belief [22].
What are Measurement Invariance (MI) Tests?
The SBS provides a reliable, valid, and useful measure of religiosity in the cultural context in
which it was developed. But to be useful for testing hypotheses about cross-cultural univer-
sals, any religiosity measure has to function equivalently across diverse cultures and lan-
guages [23]. Yet it is common practice in research on religion to simply apply instruments
developed in one culture to another. In large-scale cross-cultural surveys applications of sin-
gle item measures of religiosity are common, but they prevent the investigation of equivalent
functioning across groups. Thus, when comparing scale scores, a crucial assumption is that a
construct is measured in the same way in all of the compared groups. Also, when other infor-
mants from the same language are examined to establish convergent validity by means of
self-other correlations, self- and peer-ratings must be assumed to reflect the same construct
[24]. The assumption formally presupposes measurement invariance, which should be rigor-
ously tested [25].
Measurement invariance is the attribute that an instrument (e.g., SBS) measures the same
construct to the same extent in two different groups or data-sets (e.g., New Zealand vs. Croatia;
self- vs. peer-reports).More formally, measurement invariance, or measurement equivalence,
can be defined as the absence of group-based bias: Given an individual’s true score, the group
membership should not affect the probability of obtaining a specific observed score [25–27].
Hence, the psychometric properties, which relate the observed variables to the latent variable,
need to be similar across groups. Otherwise,meaningful comparisons between groups are
severely hampered, if not impossible [25, 28–30]. With a few notable exceptions in the field of
religion and spirituality, measurement invariance is hardly ever examined; more often there
are attempts at replicating number of factors and indicator-factor patterns, and inspecting item
means and standard deviations. If measurement invariance is ever tested, a typical outcome is
limited cross-cultural generalizability [31, 32].
Cross-Cultural Supernatural Belief
PLOS ONE | DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0164291 October 19, 2016 3 / 31
The current research focuses on the assumption of measurement invariance when assessing
supernatural belief: (a) We test the translatability and cross-cultural applicability of the SBS,
taking two “Western” countries–one from the Northern, one from the SouthernHemisphere–
as a starting point; (b) we provide stringent evidence for its convergent validity in terms of self-
peer-agreement; to do so (c) we present a newmeasurement invariance testing strategy that
accommodates the dependent nature of self- and peer-data. Measurement invariance is most
frequently tested by multiple-group confirmatory factor analysis (MGCFA), which assumes
the independence of the groups being compared. Yet, whenever researchers use peer-reports to
validate self-reports, the individual is no longer the sampling unit. This is a problem for the sta-
tistical analysis. Given the violation of the independence assumption, biased parameters and
standard errors will result. We suggest measurement invariance tests that account for the statis-
tical dependency of such dyadic data [33]. We term this approach dependent-group confirma-
tory factor analysis (DGCFA). It can be applied to validation approaches of any psychological
construct based on self-other data that are nested within the same targets, including any behav-
ioral measures with a cross-informant component, or other forms of dependency between
whole groups.
Establishing measurement invariance requires a sequential test of hierarchical model speci-
fications, depending in part on the goals of the study, and inspectingmodel fit [34, 35]. Which
kind of research questions can be asked depends on the specific levels of measurement invari-
ance achieved (cf. Table 1). One naming scheme for the degrees of measurement invariance is
weak, strong, strict factorial invariance, after which follows the inspection of full invariance or
structural invariance [25]. We use the naming scheme that describes the increasing equality
constraints within the framework of confirmatory factor analysis [36, 37], resulting in four MI-
levels: (a) Configural invariance: The least stringent test examines if the same number of factors
and the items that load on these factors apply to both groups. There are no equivalency con-
straints in this model [38]. The configural invariance model serves as a baselinemodel for
Table 1. Levels of Measurement Invariance: Equality Constraints, Model Identification, and Permissible Comparisons.
Equality Constraint
Across Groups








structures identified like any
SEM
Similar, but not identical constructs
(equal dimensionality, factor form)
Further MI-levels
Metric Factor loadings Factor variances in the
reference group = 1
Units of measurement (scaling) (Co-)Variances of latent variables
between or within scales
Scalar Item intercepts Factor means in the reference
group = 0
Item difficulty (bias) Latent factor means
Uniqueness Residual variances - Amount of unique variance
(including error variance)
Manifest item and scale properties




Factor variances Factor variances - - Amount of variability, reliability
Factor
covariances
Factor covariances - - Cross-culturally replicable
relationships
Factor means Factor means - - Cross-cultural means
Note: Comparisons are valid only if a specific model is tenable, that is, when the model for a level of measurement invariance does not fit significantly worse
than the level before it. Constraints may be relaxed until a level of partial measurement invariance holds.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0164291.t001
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furtherMI-tests. (b)Metric invariance: Equal factor loadings across groups imply that the
underlying scale is the same across groups, so participants use a commonmetric.Metric invari-
ance is both necessary and sufficient for comparing factor correlations across groups. Without
it, groups do not share an understanding of the construct [28]. (c) Scalar invariance: Adding
equal regression intercepts across groups (also known as item thresholds) tests for equivalent
item difficulties, so that group bias does not impact on factor means at the latent level. Legiti-
mate comparisons of factor means across groups requires scalar invariance, because it ensures
fairness and equity [34]. As Chen writes, “Otherwise, it is not certain whether group differences
on factor means are attributable to valid cultural differences or to measurement artifacts” [28]
(p.1006). (d)Uniqueness invariance: Finally, equal residual variances across groups imply that
the item uniqueness terms are equivalent. This level ensures that the unexplained error vari-
ance of each item is the same between groups, which is required to compare observed scores
(e.g., item or scale means) across groups. Otherwise, the means of residuals might differ
because the errors represent unmodeled systematic variance, but differently so across groups.
Alternatively, different item intercepts in the regressions might have beenmasked by unequal
residual variance [39–42]. This MI-level must also hold if achieving equally reliable measure-
ment across groups is an objective (this latter aspect additionally calls for equal factor vari-
ances) [37].
In cross-cultural research, it is often assumed that equivalence at the initial stages (factor
form and loadings) is sufficient to determine whether a construct can be assessed invariantly
across cultural groups [43], because levels beyondmetric invariance are often difficult to
achieve [40, 42, 44]. As long as one is interested only in correlations between factors this level
may be fine. Yet comparing factor means (or scale means) always requires scalar (or unique-
ness) invariance.
The typical approach tests for deviations from strictly identical parameters. What if the
model fit does not support invariance at one level? One way out is to compose the scale of only
those items that show equivalent parameters. This strategy comes at the expense of losing cru-
cial information on specific content. A better way is to accommodate unequal parameters
within the CFA framework. The notion of “partial measurement invariance” describes that
equality constraints are sequentially relaxed; in other words, constraints are imposed on some
but not all of the factor loadings (or intercepts; see [45]). At least two loadings (or intercepts)
have to be equivalent to scale (or locate) latent variables correctly and comparably. Ideally,
most of the parameters should be invariant on each level, while only few parameters differ
between groups [45]. Obviously, the degree of noninvariance matters. A minority of extremely
variant items may hurt cross-cultural comparisons more than a majority of items that are sta-
tistically salient but not detrimental to practical scale uses. Unequal item intercepts may either
bias the factor scores or, cancel each other out, thus, hardly affecting estimated factor scores.
Alternatively, Bayesian approaches to “approximate measurement invariance” can properly
incorporate (negligible) nonequivalent parameters [46, 47].
Strictly speaking, if at least partial invariance is met, furtherMI tests can be carried out,
including tests of structural parameters [34]. So at least partialmetric invariance is necessary
to scale the factors in each group on a commonmetric; and at least partial scalar invariance is
required for numerical comparisons of latent means across cultures [36, 45]. As a caveat, the
more adjustments for noninvariance are necessary below the level of uniqueness invariance,
the more difficult to interpret are the residuals. Yet, even lack of measurement invariance may
be informative. From a theoretical view, noninvariance can hint at different psychological pro-
cesses in groups, or indicate how operationalizations should change. Yet from a practical point
of view, the consequential validity of a scale may be relatively unaffected if a measurement
model were misspecified such that slightly varying parameters are assumed to be equivalent.
Cross-Cultural Supernatural Belief
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Once (partial)measurement invariance is met, other aspects of full or structural invariance
can be tested across group, such as equal factor means or factor variances and covariances.
Invariance of structural parameters, a priori, are not of theoretical relevance to our research
questions, yet because of the complexity of the measurement model adopted for the SBS we
will later return to the structural properties, before we can safely test and establish metric
invariance.
Why Is Measurement Invariance Important in Research Involving
Cultural or Self-Peer Comparisons?
The questions asked for cross-cultural comparisons may differ from those asked for self-peer
comparisons, but the scientific hypotheses that can be tested always depend on the established
level of measurement invariance (summarized in Table 1). Regardingmetric invariance, as
Chen [28] articulately explained, unequal factor loadings imply that the units of measurement
differ, preventing a meaningful comparison of correlational relationships of a construct across
cultural contexts, not to mention the implied impossibility of comparing factor means or com-
posite scores such as scale sums or means. Unequal loadings might occurwhen the meaning of
the concept—in this case, supernatural belief—differs across cultures, or when items have been
inappropriately translated. Similarly, peer-reports can only serve as a validation criterion to the
degree that peers are able to rate target characteristics along the same scale. Yet cognitive, moti-
vational, and epistemic biases are known to affect the measurement of others’ unobserved (and
often unobservable) characteristics, also, or particularly, in intimate relationships [48, 49]. For
instance, targets and peers might not discussmatters of belief at all. In any dyadic situation,
unequal loadings imply that peer-reports cannot be legitimately used for validating self-reports
by correlation. If many items had noninvariant loadings, one might debate whether compari-
sons of factor means across groups are trulymeaningful. If there were several items that dif-
fered strongly in their loadings across groups, this might indicate a different understanding of
the construct in both groups; small deviations, however, may hardly affect any of the substan-
tial conclusions.
Furthermore, regarding scalar invariance, unequal intercepts prevent clear interpretation of
group differences on factor means, as (potentially valid) cultural differences are confounded
with mere measurement artifacts (bias). Whenever intercepts differ across groups one cannot
distinguish belief levels from different “calibrations” for expressing such belief. For instance,
people from different cultures might rate their beliefs against different reference frameworks
for expressing belief. Differential social desirability concerns might result in consistently higher
or lower belief ratings in one group. In the context of dyads, unequal intercepts might reflect
differential evaluation apprehension or modesty norms that may not apply to informant-rat-
ings on others’ religious beliefs. Also lack of insight about specific beliefs on the belief-holder’s
side might prevent equal intercepts across self- and peer-raters. Differing intercepts raise ques-
tions about their origin: Are they due to a unique understanding of items, perhaps group-spe-
cific language use or response-styles, or do they reflect a translation issue? Common cross-
cultural differences unrelated to the construct—for example, in(ter)dependent self-construal
and emotional display rules—can pose threats to scalar invariance too.
With regard to uniqueness invariance, if items lack equal residual variances, this undermines
equal reliability across cultures, likewise across self- and peer-raters. Crucially, specificmanifest
item scores cannot be compared then because unexplained variability introduces different
amounts of error to the observed scores. The comparison of composite scores is jeopardized
due to the underlying different item utilization. As DeShon [39] (p.104) has aptly put it, “error
variance is not only a random process, but also the effect of unmodeled sources of systematic
Cross-Cultural Supernatural Belief
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variance that affect measured responses.” Unequal residual variances indicate that the items,
dissimilarly across groups, capture random variance and/or unique variance in the form of
unmodeled influences, indicating potential model misspecification.
Current Research and Hypotheses
Given the universal relevance of supernatural beliefs and the methodological intricacies
involved in assessing them, establishing whether supernatural beliefs can be assessed validly
across contexts is essential. Scores from scales that lack measurement invariance can bemis-
leading, biasing inferences about hypotheses [28].
The present research serves as an opening step to the essential question of validity of cross-
cultural supernatural beliefs. First, we present an initial test of the claim to translatability and
applicability of supernatural belief as assessed by the SBS to a setting different from the seminal
one. Despite scores of measures targeting religiosity and related constructs [50, 51], we simply
do not know if religious belief sensu SBS can bemeasured validly in any different language at
all. Without global data on the SBS being available yet, we start with a glimpse at a Croatian
translation. Second, ours is also the first attempt to examine measurement invariance across
self- and peer-ratings of supernatural belief. Previous dyadic (family) research, has seen precur-
sors of measurement invariance tests for partners in couple relationships or twins–who each
reported on themselves (e.g., [52]; see [24] for current practices). Yet, across all psychological
domains, self-other agreement has been estimated without establishing measurement invari-
ance across these two sources of data. We fill this gap by showing that, like other dyadic cases,
ratings of identical targets involve the non-independence of data that must be accounted for
whenever distinguishable self- and informant-ratings, nested within targets, are compared.
As a test case, we contrast Croatia, a country in the Northern Hemisphere, to New Zealand
in the SouthernHemisphere, where the SBS originated. Both have a similar number of resi-
dents and can be considered–inmany regards–“Western” countries. Like New Zealand, Croa-
tia has a Christian cultural heritage, but, unlike New Zealand, it has resisted secularization.
Indeed, census data indicate that whereas about 42% of New Zealanders identify as nonreli-
gious [53], 86% of Croatians still identify as Roman Catholic [54]. Furthermore, ever since its
declaration of independence and the dissolution of former Yugoslavia, the country has held
and maintained strong ties with the Vatican, making religious questions a matter national
identity; being Croatian is in some segments of the population often equated with being Catho-
lic. Thus, while the move from the New Zealand context to the Croatian one may not seem to
be an extreme one, it in fact provides a fair test of the SBS’s robustness to translation and a first
cross-cultural application (for related challenges in personality assessment, cf. [55]). Finally,
only few studies on the Croatian population used supernatural/paranormal belief measures
[56], and there has been no rigorous attempt at ensuring the cross-cultural equivalence of any
of these tests.
A second goal of the current study is to ascertain the validity of “religious belief”as a cogni-
tive construct via both self- and peer-reports. Although self-insight is often considered
uniquely human, it is an imperfect skill, subject to various sources of bias. As Podsakoff and
colleagues [57] documented, response style, need for consistency, implicit theories, social desir-
ability, and positive affect can all distort self-reports. These biases have implications for evalua-
tions of the convergent validity of any self-reportmeasure, insofar as criteria are also based on
self-report [58]. It may appear as though the SBS enjoys high convergent validity, as SBS scores
are strongly correlated with other self-reportmeasures of religiosity (e.g., identity, behavior),
but these correlations may be over-inflated by same-source biases introduced by self-presenta-
tion and introspective limits. Given the rather complex SBS-measurement model and its
Cross-Cultural Supernatural Belief
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facetted representation of supernatural beliefs, applying the measurement model to peer-
reports may not result in goodmodel fit empirically.
The problem of commonmethod variance has long been recognized as a threat to validity
[59, 60]. One method of mitigating method-related bias is to supplement self-ratings with a
different “method” such as peer-reports [61]. However, the accuracy—that is, the predictive
validity—of peer-reports are themselves contingent upon various factors, including the observ-
ability of the dimension to be rated [62–64], and the closeness of the peer being reported on
[65, 66]. To establish a valid peer-version of the SBS, we therefore asked participants’ self-nom-
inated significant others for their evaluations of ratees’ beliefs. The chosen peers were meant to
be people who knew the target participant very well, alleviating the aforementioned problems
of access to information.We then tested whether the measurement model originally developed
for self-reports could recover the covariance structure and explain the underlying nature of
data from knowledgeable informants. Failure to do so would prima facie rule out peer-reports
as a suitable validation criterion for religious cognition. If measurement invariance between
self- and peer-ratings can be established, we can interpret the correlations between self- and
peer-ratings as further indications of convergent validity of the SBS. Despite various biases, we
were not pessimistic about establishing invariance, given that peers were from the same culture
and could have easily been selected as the target persons reporting on themselves.
The present study tests six hypotheses. As previous analyses on two independent samples
fromNew Zealand converged on two specificmodels as the best explanation of the SBS item
covariance matrix, we expect that the same models will also fit Croatian data better than com-
petingmodels (Hypothesis 1). We expect that the Croatian and New Zealand SBS show at least
metric, if not scalar, and, ideally, uniqueness invariance [67, 68] (Hypothesis 2). Similarly, we
expect that the New Zealandmeasurement model will fit the Croatian SBS peer-ratings
(Hypothesis 3), and that Croatian SBS will show at least metric, if not scalar, and, ideally,
uniqueness invariance across peer- and self-ratings (Hypothesis 4). Assuming sufficient invari-
ance between self- and peer-ratings, we expect that zero-order and latent level correlations
between self- and peer-ratings will indicate substantial convergent validity of the Croatian SBS
(Hypothesis 5). Finally, assuming validity, manifest SBS scores will predict religious behaviors
such as frequency of private prayer, public attendance of religious services, and participating in
religious rituals (Hypothesis 6).
Materials and Methods
Ethics Statement
The ethical principles as laid out by theWMADeclaration of Helsinki (2013), binding for med-
ical research, were observed. Legally, no formal ethics approval is required for social science
research in many European countries, unless the research objectives involve issues regulated by
law, which was not the case (e.g., use of medications, medical devices, psychological interven-
tion, or deception). Prior to commencement, we obtained a waiver of permission from the Cro-
atian research institute's ethics committee.
Our procedures were in accordance with the standards published by the German Society for
Psychology, an adaptation of the APA’s ethical principles and code of conduct. Participants
were recruited at the Croatian colleague‘s research institution. Participants were invited and
informed by a researcher (or assistant) which procedures were involved in the entirely volun-
tary study. Participants were assured of their anonymity. Questionnaires were handed out
together with an information sheet for written informed consent. Participants who were willing
to contribute simply returned the package completed.
Cross-Cultural Supernatural Belief
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Croatian Supernatural Belief Scale
The ten-item SBS was translated from English into Croatian by three researchers (graduate and
PhD level) at a public university. All keywords like god, demon, angel, devil, heaven, hell, mira-
cles and souls exist in Croatian and are used in the same context as are in English. A few items
were discussed to choose the Croatian wording that best represented the meaning of the origi-
nal statements. We ensured the quality of the translation by acquiring a retranslation from a
fourth colleague (PhD level psychology student) proficient in English and Croatian. As the sen-
tences are straightforward, the Croatian translations of all the items were closely back-trans-
lated within minor semantic nuances. Agreement with the ten statements is expressed on
9-point Likert scales, anchored at “strongly disagree” (−4) and “strongly agree” (4).
Participants and Procedure
This study was run as part of a larger study on individual difference variables; the other mea-
sures in the study were unrelated to the present investigation. Volunteers were recruited at a
large public university, so that 642 Croatian students—from freshmen to senior year, 69.0%
females, 29.6%males, 1.4% unspecified (Mage = 20.38 [18–50] years, SD = 2.66)—participated
in the study with the permission of the faculty and the professors of selected classes. Some of
the professors offered extra course credits as a compensation, but we did not follow up on
which students were compensated. Study majors included Psychology, Sociology, Communica-
tion Studies, Journalism, Electrical Engineering, and Computer science. Participants returned
the distributed questionnaires within one week. Five participants not providing any SBS data
are not included in SBS self-report analyses.
Participants first answered a sociodemographicquestionnaire, including the question
“What is your religious denomination?” The majority of the university sample consisted of
Christians (66.8%), followed by atheists and agnostics (29.1%), and then participants from
other religious traditions (2.0%; e.g., Buddhist); 2.0% of participants did not answer the
question.
Next participants completed the SBS, along with frequencymeasures of religious behavior,
in particular how frequently they prayed, attended church/holy mass, and took communion.
Table 2 displays the frequency of the religious activities as a function of religious domination.
More than 95% of the Christians reported that they prayed; more than 84% claimed to go to
Church at least once a year; 63% reported taking communion at least once a year.
Each participant was also asked to recruit the person who knew them best to independently
fill in a similar set of questionnaires about them.We stressed that the participant and the infor-
mant were to fill in the questionnaires separately and independently of each other. The com-
pleted questionnaires were to be returned one week later in sealed envelopes. Only nine
participants were unable to elicit any data from their peers (these peers are not included in
analyses involving peer-reports); altogether, responses from 633 peers were obtained. As part
of their questionnaires, peers were asked what their relationship was to the target participants;
39.3% were friends, 23.5% were romantic partners, 19.8% were parents, and 12.8% were
siblings.
Additionally, for a cross-cultural comparison, we used a previously collected sample of 360
English-speaking students to inspect measurement invariance (62.5% females,Mage = 20.92,
SD = 3.65). These participants had been recruited at a New Zealand university and sampled
from various study majors (original research presented by Jong et al. [11]). According to self-
reported ethnic background (multiple nominations were possible), the majority of the sample
had a European/Caucasian heritage (approx. 80%), followed by Pacific Islander, Asian, African,
and Indian ethnic backgrounds. In terms of religion, 55% of the participants categorized
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themselves as None/Atheist/Agnostic/Undecided; 42% reported to be Christian; the rest identi-
fied as Spiritual, Free Thinker, Muslim, Hindu, Buddhist or “other”.
Statistical Analysis and Evaluation of Model Fit
Mplus 7.11 [69] was used to implement the CFAs, other analyses were run with SPSS 21. When
assuming normal theory (maximum likelihood estimation; ML) for ordinal data, this choice
can yield biased parameter estimates when the number of categories is very small. Given that
five or more response categories yield ML estimators that are not worse than weighted least
squares estimators (WLSMV; [70–72]), we opted for ML to model the nine SBS response
categories.
We obtainedML estimates of the CFA parameters with robust standard errors to account
for violations of multivariate normality assumptions (self-data: χ2(20) = 8588.83, p< .0001).
Without robust procedures model fit indices would be biased.Mplus provides MLR for maxi-
mum likelihoodwith robust ‘Huber-White’ standard errors and a scaled test statistic asymptot-
ically equivalent to the Yuan–Bentler T2 statistic [73–75] and similar to the robust Satorra–
Bentler scaled χ2-statistic (MLM [76, 77]). When conducting χ2-difference tests (or Likelihood
Ratio Tests; [78]), the procedure has to be corrected for the scaling factors of robust MLR pro-
cedures [79–81]. Then the “Satorra–Bentler scaled chi-quared tests”–and other goodness-of-fit
statistics based on scaled chi-square–are robust to nonnormality.
Given the limitations of any individual fit index, we tested the goodness-of-fit of plausible
models using multiple criteria. First, to establish model fit, the χ2-test would ideally be non-sig-
nificant [82], and the χ2/df ratio should be as low as possible, ideally at least as low as 2 [83].
Second, the comparative fit index (CFI) with values> .95/.90 indicates good/appropriate
model fit, respectively [84, 85]. Third, the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA)
with values of .00–.05/.06–.08/.09–.10 indicates good/reasonable/poormodel fit respectively
[86]. Fourth, the standardized root mean square residual (SRMR) with values less than .05/.08
reflects good/ appropriate fit [85, 87]. Finally, we used the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC)
[88] for single-group CFAs and the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) [89] for invariance
tests with multiple-group CFAs [90]. Lower AIC values indicate a more accurate model, and
similarly so for BIC, though BIC reflects the true data generating process better, as it penalizes
overly complex (less parsimonious) models more strictly than AIC. Hence lower BIC values
Table 2. Frequency of Croatian Participants’ Religious Behavior as a Function of Self-Reported Religion.
Never Less than once a year At least once a year At least once a month At least once a week Every day TOTAL
Attends Church/Holy Mass
Christian 19 47 160 94 104 2 426
Atheist/Agnostic 99 57 26 1 1 0 184
Other 9 2 1 0 0 0 12
Takes Holy Communion
Christian 56 102 174 63 33 1 429
Atheist/Agnostic 138 41 8 0 0 0 187
Other 11 2 0 0 0 0 13
Prays
Christian 19 24 47 86 79 171 426
Atheist/Agnostic 115 31 27 5 5 3 186
Other 2 0 2 1 1 7 13
Note: Due to item non-response, Ns = 622, 629, and 625 for Holy Mass, Holy Communion, and Prayer, respectively.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0164291.t002
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indicate a better trade-off between fit and complexity. For both AIC and BIC, differences in
information criteria greater than +10 provide “strong evidence” against equal fit of the models
in question [91].
All cut-offs for each of these fit indices are approximations and subject to model-complexity
and population characteristics. The acceptance of a measurement model is not a binary (pass-
fail) decision, nor does acceptance dependwholly on strict adherence to the cut-offs [92, 93].
Rather, the best practice in accepting a model involves the comparative testing of alternative
models on the same data [94].
Results
Comparing New Zealand and Croatian Samples
To assess the applicability of the SBS to a new culture, two types of analysis were run. The first
step concerned an inconspicuous test with CFAs run on the Croatian data to ascertainwhether
or not the samemeasurement models provided as good fit to the Croatian SBS as to the original
SBS. This step not only replicates the seminal model selection procedure with an independent
sample in a different culture; it also reduces the risk of starting the measurement invariance
tests with a misspecifiedCroatian model. The second step invoked the crucial invariance tests
to directly compare the two cultures.
Self-report SBS data from 637 Croatian participants were available. Missing values were
negligible (0.87% of SBS cells), and were evenly spread across the SBS variables. Little’s MCAR
test [95] across self- and peer-data showed that the pattern did not significantly differ from
data missing completely at random, χ2 = 165.43, df = 209, p = .99. Missing data, handled by the
Mplus default procedure “Full Information Maximum Likelihood” (FIML), are unlikely to
adversely affect parameter estimates.
The mean SBS score was close to the midpoint of the 9-point rating scale,M = 0.15,
SD = 2.27. All items of the SBS scale were highly correlated, r = .43–.90, ps< .001 (cf. Table 3,
also for descriptives). On the basis of n = 631 complete SBS responders, Cronbach’s α = .95
(CI95% = .94–.95). However, Cronbach’s α assumes unidimensionality; in the presence of sec-
ondary factors the assumptions for α here are unmet. Reliability estimates will be provided on
the basis of SEM (see S2 File), once a measurement model has been accepted.
Table 3. Descriptives, Correlations, Item Loadings and Communalities with Supernatural Belief-Factor (Unidimensionality Assumed).
Self Peer Correlations Self Peer
M SD M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 λ h2 λ h2
1 God 0.50 2.97 0.57 2.94 .77 .80 .78 .67 .62 .59 .86 .79 .72 .59 .87 .76 .88 .77
2 Devil −0.51 2.89 −0.17 2.89 .76 .62 .79 .83 .58 .54 .78 .80 .66 .57 .86 .73 .87 .75
3 Angels 0.22 2.73 0.37 2.75 .75 .74 .67 .78 .67 .65 .78 .72 .75 .64 .87 .76 .90 .80
4 Demons −0.77 2.72 −0.52 2.70 .61 .81 .73 .54 .60 .58 .68 .70 .62 .61 .76 .58 .82 .67
5 Souls 1.31 2.61 1.11 2.66 .66 .58 .65 .50 .52 .78 .64 .60 .62 .46 .74 .55 .74 .55
6 Spiritual Realm 1.75 2.45 1.50 2.49 .58 .54 .65 .50 .77 .53 .62 .59 .66 .50 .71 .51 .73 .53
7 Heaven −0.01 2.92 0.36 2.92 .82 .75 .73 .61 .64 .58 .70 .91 .72 .61 .89 .79 .90 .82
8 Hell −0.39 2.85 −0.01 2.88 .74 .76 .67 .64 .56 .51 .90 .64 .66 .57 .84 .70 .87 .75
9 Miracles 0.74 2.83 0.74 2.74 .74 .67 .75 .60 .64 .64 .73 .66 .63 .69 .84 .71 .82 .67
10 Prophecy −1.29 2.54 −0.87 2.65 .52 .47 .56 .49 .43 .44 .52 .50 .62 .49 .62 .38 .70 .48
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ConfirmatoryFactor Analysis. In the initial step, we used CFA to compare previously
developedmodels (see S1–S8 Figs for modelsM1 to M8) to ascertain the best measurement
model for the Croatian SBS (cf. S1 File). All indices converged on model fit (S2 Table). The
only models to achieve sufficientmodel fit, supported by AIC, were essentially unidimensional
models with an orthogonal method factor for negative item content and five facets for the
related item-pairs (M4/M5, Figs 1 and 2). This replicates the seminal CFA results for the New
Zealand sample [11]. Note that the models M4 and M5 are functionally equivalent (same
degrees of freedom). By definition, there are no covariances among the factors. Yet, M5 models
the item-pair specific covariance at the level of additional content factors, thereby “explaining”
variance. M4 instead models the same item-pair specific covariance as if these were “unex-
plained” residual correlations between items. To estimate reliability, modelM5 will be used.
The internal consistency of a construct is evidenced if at least half the variance can be
extracted by the focal construct, AVE (average variance explained)> .50 [20]. The average var-
iance explained in all ten indicators amounted to AVE = .81, reflecting the proportion of test
variance due to all identified common factors including orthogonal method and content facets.
The dominant factor by itself, that is, the common core of supernatural beliefs, explained on
average 62% of the variance, reflecting the extent to which the variance of item answers can be
attributed to the dominant latent supernatural belief trait. Recommended reliability cutoffs
depend on the purpose and use of a scale. Estimates below .60 are generally considered too low;
values around .70 may be acceptable for exploratory studies and group experiments; values
around .80 are recommended for reliable interindividual differences in basic research, and .90
(with .95 desirable) is recommended for applied test use if crucial individual decisions are at
stake [96, 97]. The construct reliability was high, Ow = .95, representing the maximum reliabil-
ity of an optimally weighted linear combination of standardized regression coefficients of the
supernatural belief factor [21]. Despite the presence of secondary factors (orthogonal sources
of variance), the scale composite of a linear combination of unweighted items was reliable too,
O = .94 [21].
CorroboratingHypothesis 1, the previously acceptedmodel explained the data best, mirror-
ing Jong and colleagues’ [11] findings in their New Zealand sample. Once again, the translated
SBS was essentially unidimensional with all items loading on one dominant factor and with
model fit significantly improved by orthogonal factors for negative content and specific super-
natural content-facets.
Measurement Invariance Tests for IndependentGroups. The crucial steps in determin-
ing whether SBS scores are comparable across groups were the step-by-step MI-tests as
described above (cf. Table 1). By default, on the basis of measurement modelM5, within each
group the covariances among item residuals, as well as among factors, were fixed to zero, but
factor variances were freely estimated across groups (model identification within each group
per first item loading set to 1 for each factor). As somemodels failed to converge when running
tests on M5, we tested invariance on the basis of M4, in which five theoretically-derivedcorre-
lated item-pairs, rather than latent variables, reflect the content facets. These residual covari-
ances were allowed to differ in the initial MI-tests, until constrained to equality in later
structural invariance tests. Note that, despite the basic equivalence of the modelsM4 and M5,
the outcomes of MI-tests could differ slightly.
A variety of fit indices were inspected, including changes in BIC. The χ2-difference test (or
LikelihoodRatio Test; [78]), corrected for the scaling factors of robust MLR procedures [79–
81], should be non-significant. As χ2-difference tests are notoriously sensitive to sample size
despite overall goodmodel fit [98, 99], we inspected changes in CFI and RMSEA, which should
be as small as possible [100]. The use of strict cut-offs is increasingly discouraged [101, 102],
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Fig 1. Measurement model M4. Essentially unidimensional model (SB) with method factor and five facets (correlated uniqueness) (M4).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0164291.g001
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but the conventional wisdom stipulates that ΔCFI −0.01 is acceptable as long as it is balanced
by an increase of ΔRMSEA no greater than +0.015.
As depicted in Table 4, the configural invariance test was unproblematic. Among the con-
ventional models, the metric invariance model clearly had the best trade-off betweenmodel fit
and complexity (lowest BIC). Fixing intercepts (scalar invariance) and residual variances
(uniqueness invariance) to be equal across groups decreasedmodel fit substantially, as evident
in the χ2-difference tests and changes in CFI and RMSEA beyond the critical cut-offs. Concerns
Fig 2. Measurement model M5. Essentially unidimensional model (SB) with method factor and five facets (content factors) (M5).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0164291.g002
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about the appropriateness of cut-offs notwithstanding, the SBS clearly enjoys metric but not
scalar invariance.
However, the result of the omnibus χ2-test of scalar invariance is not evidence that all inter-
cepts are unequal [36]. So we tested for partial scalar invariance across cultures [103]. On the
basis of modification indices, we gradually allowed a few select parameters to differ freely
across groups [45]. Partial invariance tests are considered to be exploratory and lack any
strictly binding rules. If possible, only a few plausible parameters should be set free, other
parameters should not shift tremendously, and the evidence for significance should be stronger
than just at p = .05 at the minimal critical test-value of Δχ2 (df = 1)> 3.84 [36]. Some authors
suggest a “5% of scale-length” heuristic to evaluate critical threshold differences [102].
Modification indices for the scalar model (MI3) suggested unequal intercepts of items #5
and #7. The groups differed how strongly they endorsed belief in “heaven” and “soul”. Partici-
pants from New Zealand had previously reported stronger belief in heaven than participants
from Croatia (unstandardized intercept a = 0.07 vs. −0.38, both SEs = 0.15, ModIndex = 20.00,
Δχ2 = 21.04). Croatians, on the other hand, endorsed the belief in souls more strongly than had
New Zealanders (a = 1.01 vs 0.43, SE = 0.12 vs. 0.13, ModIndex = 25.25, Δχ2 = 27.60). The item
bias minimally exceeded the threshold of the 5%-heuristic (0.45 for the 9-point scale). This
either suggests that respondents endorsed these beliefs differently, the translations conveyed
different connotations, or that our participants were differently calibrated for other reasons
[28, 104]–a more item-specific post-hoc explanation for these items is difficult. The bias
appears to be not too severe. Given the similar size and opposite directions of the threshold
shifts, they tend to cancel each other out at the scale level. Sequentially relaxing these intercepts
in the model clearly improved fit (MI3a). Hence, the SBS enjoys partial scalar invariance, war-
ranting further invariance tests beyond this level.
With these relaxed assumptions we examined the equality of item residuals between groups
(MI4a). This uniqueness invariance model fitted the data well. As the error variances of SBS
items were comparable across groups, equal reliability of observed SBS scores may be assumed
across groups if—in addition to equal factor loadings—factor variances are also equal, as tested
next on the structural invariance level [105].
Structural invariance tests are helpful when the evaluation of structural parameters—factor
means and (co)variances—is of interest. Due to the complexity of the SBS measurement
model, five pairwise covariances form an integral part of the SBS measurement model under
test; in the alternative model they would be reflected in additional factor loadings of five latent
Table 4. Sequential Measurement Invariance Tests via Comparisons of Models with Increasing Equality Constraints: MGCFA: Croatia vs. New
Zealand.
Model Comparison Loadings Intercepts Residuals Structure df χ2 Δdf Δχ2 p CFI RMSEA BIC MI
MI1 Configural 54 165.69*** - - - .979 .064 39631 Yes
MI2 Metric × 65 216.39*** 11 53.59 < .001 .971 .068 39617 Yes
MI3 Scalar × × 73 303.84*** 8 107.74 < .001 .956 .080 39669 No
MI4 Uniqueness × × × 83 318.00*** 10 21.40 .018 .955 .075 39640 No
MI3a Partial Scalar × (5&7 freed) 71 255.20*** 6 45.60 < .001 .965 .072 39620 Yes
MI4a Uniqueness × (5&7 freed) × 81 270.36*** 10 20.64 .024 .964 .068 39591 Yes
MI5 Variances × (5&7 freed) × Cov 88 297.98*** 7 26.18 < .001 .960 .069 39601 Yes
MI6 Full × (5&7 freed) × Cov, Means 90 304.31*** 2 6.17 .046 .959 .069 39593 Yes
Note: Ncross-culture = 360 and 637 for New Zealanders and Croatians, respectively
*** p < .001. Best-fitting constrained models in bold. Δχ2 refers to Satorra-Bentler scaled-χ2 difference tests.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0164291.t004
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variables reflecting the content facets. Before we can safely assume metric invariance within the
context of M4, we need to ascertain that the five pairwise covariances are also equivalent across
groups. Technically, such residual covariances are mostly not considered structural parameters,
but treated as error; as such, one would not expect (and test) their equivalence across groups.
Yet in the case of M4, they reflect an invariant and intended part of the measurement model.
Though they had been freely estimated up to here, the SBS measurement model M4 requires
testing their equality across groups. This test replaces the test of equal factor loadings of the
five content factors in psychometric modelM5. The next model test occurredwithin the con-
text of two noninvariant intercepts (MI5). It simultaneously invoked a test of equal factor vari-
ances (for both groups fixed to 1), a prerequisite to conclude to equal measurement reliability
and similar impact of the error covariances on the observed scores. As from the beginning, fac-
tor covariances in both groups were fixed to zero (supernatural belief factor and method factor
for negative items are orthogonal). A slight decrease in model fit, but one well within conven-
tionally accepted limits, occurred. The prior conclusion of metric invariance was justified,
although the loadings of content facets could not be tested in the metric invariance model
(MI2) on the basis of M4. In sum, we confirmedHypothesis 2 on measurement invariance.
Within the previous model (MI5), another structural property, latent SBS factor means, can
be examined for group differences (the reference group’s factor mean was fixed to zero, the
other freely estimated). The factor mean difference of 0.13 in standardized units (SE = 0.07; p =
.06) agreed with the observed scale mean difference: Croatians had reported negligibly higher
supernatural belief than New Zealanders,Ms = 0.15 vs. −0.15, SDs = 2.27 vs. 2.28, t(995) =
2.00, p = .046, Cohen’s d = 0.13. The minimal disagreement in p-values between the two
approaches shows that even a few noninvariant items might alter a researcher’s conclusion.
Especially in the vicinity of conventional significance levels, we recommend not exclusively
relying on manifest sum scores or scale means as indicators of supernatural belief levels, rather
to use properly specifiedmodels in SEM. The final constraint of equal latent means (MI6)
made almost no difference with regard to model fit.
We next discuss our invariance findings and derive recommendations for SBS scale use.
“Many studies examiningMI of survey scales have shown that the MI assumption is very hard
to meet. In particular, strict forms of MI rarely hold”[106] (p.1064). By contrast, the SBS was
invariant at the metric level and partially invariant at the level of scalar invariance. In the end,
except for two noninvariant intercepts that did not introduce strong bias on the total scale, the
SBS exhibited full measurement invariance across the two cultures. The implication is that
supernatural belief, despite its faceted nature, has basically the same psychometric properties
across these two cultural contexts. This is consistent with the idea that the SBS items are inter-
preted in a similar manner across our participant groups, and the same construct is beingmea-
sured. As a consequence, belief levels (factor means) and relationships between supernatural
belief and further constructs (latent correlations) within one culture can be legitimately com-
pared to factor means and latent correlations in the other culture. Furthermore, the assessment
of supernatural belief was equally reliable in both cultures, so that evenmanifest correlation
coefficients at the level of observed SBS composite scores may be compared. Finally, within
margins, even observedmean scores within each culture may be legitimately a compared across
the two cultures. The high quality of the SBS allows researchers to compare correlations,
unstandardized regression coefficients, and standardized effect sizes from experiments across
the two cultures under consideration.
Our results also hint at minor cross-cultural limits of the SBS. Most but not all of the items
enjoyed scalar invariance [45]. We caution readers that, when working with scale means out-
side of SEM, any unequal intercepts may distort the comparison across cultural groups [30].
Though this concern appears to be rather negligible for New Zealanders and Croatians, we
Cross-Cultural Supernatural Belief
PLOS ONE | DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0164291 October 19, 2016 16 / 31
suggest accommodating noninvariance within SEM and only then comparing the properly esti-
mated latent factor means. Researchers should be hesitant to compare factor means across cul-
tures, especially if intercept differences are not only statistically significant but tangible; it
indicates that items are not similarly difficult for all respondents, so the constructmight be dif-
ferently understood. As Chen [28] noted: “As the proportion of noninvariant items increases,
confidence decreases about the validity of this approach. Even when only a small proportion of
the items are different, the following questions remain: Why are those items different? Is it due
to specific samples or due to the scale?” (p. 1015).
In the present case, it might be that Croatians truly differ slightly from New Zealanders in
accepting “souls” and “heaven” into their supernatural thinking. Alternatively, the item bias
might represent a methodological artifact for unknown reasons, which affects how factor scores
are estimated for each sample. Note that the two noninvariant intercepts, which were specified
post hoc in exploratory fashion, represent reliable findings, as they replicated in the second
Croatian data set (to which we turn next when evaluating peer-responses). The implications
are, first, that direct comparisons of manifest scores of noninvariant items are discouraged; and
second, that SBS aggregate scores were nonetheless hardly affected, presumably due to the
small size of nonequivalence, the opposing directions of threshold shifts, and the small relative
weight in the computation of scale aggregates. It is unlikely that these specific intercepts will be
affected again in future cross-cultural studies.
Future research will expand on the cross-cultural robustness of the SBS beyond the compar-
ison of Croatia and New Zealand.More importantly cross-religious research may discover
stronger group differences when involving non-Western or non-Abrahamic religious contexts.
In our sample, the average supernatural belief tendency in Croatia was practically of the same
magnitude as the one in New Zealand.When comparing countries with different religious his-
tories and societal structures (say, India or Japan), it is absolutely likely that different belief lev-
els will emerge.Whereas from the present cross-cultural comparison we tentatively conclude
that applying the SBS across cultures with similar religious backgrounds should be mostly
unproblematic, other and more adjustments to the psychometric parameters may be necessary
as the cultural backgrounds get more dissimilar.
Comparing Self- and Peer-Ratings
Establishing convergent validity requires two independent assessments of the same trait ([59]).
Peer-ratings are typically taken to provide such an independent source of evidence for an
instrument’s convergent validity, whereas other self-reportmeasures typically yield proxies for
convergent validity conflated by same-source errors. So far, most researchers have taken the
equivalence of any self- and peer-derived scores for granted. However, before interpreting any
correlations between self- and peer-ratings as evidence of convergent validity, one must ascer-
tain the comparability of the self- and peer-versions of the measurement device, in our case the
SBS, especially if the construct under scrutiny is based on unobservedcognitive content, rather
than on directly observable behavior.
We first ran CFAs to ascertainwhetherM4/M5 was the best model to accurately recover
Croatian peer-ratings, just as it did for self-reports.We then ran measurement invariance tests,
constraining an increasing number of model parameters to equality across self- and peer-rat-
ings. Finally, we examined zero-order and factor correlations between self- and peer-ratings, as
additional evidence for the convergent validity of supernatural belief as a construct and the SBS
as a measurement device thereof.
As a preliminary analysis, we examined the extent to which peer-judgments of targets’ reli-
gious affiliation indicated reliable judgments. Peers demonstrated 89.6% accuracy in describing
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targets’ religious affiliation, χ2(4) = 673.72, p< .001, Cramer’s V = .74 (three-categorical con-
tingency assessment). Peers classified a mere 3.3% of the self-reportedChristians as atheistic/
agnostic, whereas the reverse classification—judgingnonreligious targets as Christians—was
more likely (7.7%).
SBS reports from 633 Croatian peers were subjected to CFA. Missing values were negligible
(0.28% of all cells), and were evenly spread across the SBS variables and handled by the Mplus
default procedure (FIML). The mean SBS score was close to the midpoint of the 9-point rating
scale,M = 0.31, SD = 2.33. All SBS items were highly correlated, r = .54–.91, ps< .001 (cf.
Table 3). On the basis of 625 responders without any missing data, Cronbach’s α = .95 (CI95%
= .95–.96).Within the complex SBS structure, when the latent supernatural belief factor is opti-
mally assessed, the construct reliability amounted to Ow = .96; the reliability of the total scale
composite was O = .95. Yet better indictors of the reliability of manifest peer-ratings are the
average variance extracted from the items by all factors, AVE = .83. For the supernatural belief
factor by itself, AVE = .66.
ConfirmatoryFactor Analysis. The first analysis mirrored the analysis of SBS self-reports.
All indicators converged on the quality of modelM4/M5 as the most accurate model (S2
Table). Supernatural belief was confirmed as an essentially unidimensional construct that
requires an orthogonal method factor for belief entities that convey negative valence plus five
minor facets for specific content domains. Crucially, the measurement model developed for
self-reports explains the covariance matrix observed in peer-reports very well, supporting
Hypothesis 3.
Measurement Invariance Tests for DependentGroups. As previously, MI-tests pro-
ceeded in four steps before we inspected structural parameters. The metric invariance test is
critical because peers may hold information that is different from the targets’ and, they may
weigh this information differently in their judgments about targets’ supernatural belief tenden-
cies. Fit of the metric invariance model would confirm that targets and peers share their under-
standing of supernatural belief as a construct, including its underlyingmetric; this level will
suffice for using peer-ratings as a convergent validity criterion for self-reports. Scalar (and
uniqueness) invariance would indicate that asymmetries inherent in peers’ access to targets’
supernatural beliefs do not bias the estimation of belief levels at the level of factor means (or
scale composites).
To determine whether SBS scores can be validated by peer-reports requires runningMI-
tests that can accommodate nested data structures for conceptual and statistical reasons. Unlike
the comparison between independent samples from Croatia and New Zealand, the comparison
between self- and peer-ratings requires taking the statistical dependency between the two rat-
ers’ judgments of the same target into account [37]. Consequently, we subjected dependent
groups to CFA (DGCFA), accounting for correlated datasets. We thereby extend the dyadic
CFA approach [24, 33], which has been applied to dyadic data (self and partner) in couple rela-
tionship research, where dyad members usually report on themselves (two individuals). Our
approach also resembles the longitudinal CFA setup used for (auto-)correlated data collected
across time, given that data reveal something about the same individual [67, 107]. Yet the pres-
ent self-peer comparisons do not involve data that are nested within the same persons across
time; nor do they merely involve dyads with indistinguishablemembers (peers, friends); but
the data are dependent in a unique way because they are nested within the same to-be-rated tar-
get [108]. Without proper specification of this dependency, faulty model fit might be obtained,
resulting in wrong conclusions about the suitability of peer-reports. The potential downside is
that large and complex matrices can be prone to poormodel fit and improper solutions [36].
We evaluatedMI on the basis of psychometric model M4, given that M5 could not be iden-
tified for dependent groups. For each informant type we specifiedM4, including five correlated
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pairs of item residual variances within each group, representing the five content factors. Then
we combined the two groups into one connected (dyadic) SEM: we correlated—across groups
—the corresponding latent variables and the corresponding residual variances of the indicators
(Fig 3). Hence, the two groups reflected dyadic assessments of the same targets by two different
informants. To be clear, in addition to the self-peer correlations between the corresponding
latent variables for supernatural belief and method factor, the dependency of self-peer-ratings
was additionally accounted for by correlating the ten corresponding item indicators across
informants (yielding ten additional covariances between the corresponding residuals). The lat-
ter paths reflect both content- and method-based covariance that cannot be disentangled fur-
ther. Again, M4 models the five content facets by pairwise covariances. If M5 had been
identified, there would have been five additional correlations between corresponding latent
variables for the five facets. Correlations among them would have reflected and explained
peers’ facet-specific knowledge about participants, while at the same time reducing the unex-
plained variance left to item residuals.
As a technical note, for the purpose of model identification, the loadings of the first indica-
tor of each latent variable were fixed to 1. To overrideMplus default parameters and correctly
model dependent groups in DGCFA, though, all factor means in configural and metric invari-
ance models had to be fixed to 0 (to identifymean structures), whereas they were estimated
freely in the peer-group in scalar and uniqueness invariance tests.
To establish the appropriate model for configural invariance, we first checked whether
modeling the covariance between corresponding item residuals across self- and peer-data was
necessary at all. To do this, we compared a configural invariance model with parameters for
residual self-peer covariances constrained at zero to a model with those parameters uncon-
strained. The (MLR-corrected) scaled-χ2 difference-test was statistically and substantially sig-
nificant, Δχ2(10) = 148.02, p< .001. Incorporating covariances between corresponding
residuals resulted in substantially better model fit than merely assuming uncorrelated residual
terms; BIC, RMSEA, and CFI supported the superiority of this model.We conclude that, by
not accounting for the dyadic dependency, and applying standard MGCFA to dyadic data
instead, one would violate the independence assumption. Not incorporating factor correlations
across informants, let alone the residual correlations, would invalidate the subsequent MI tests
and bias convergent validity coefficients.By contrast, DGCFA correctly incorporates the statis-
tical dependencies.
The model fit indices supported configural invariance (MI1, cf. Table 5). When introducing
MI restrictions at each further step, model fit in terms of CFI and RMSEA hardly deteriorated.
According to BIC, the restrictedmodels at higherMI-levels rather improved in terms of the
accuracy-parsimony trade-off. Thus, the self-peer comparison formally demonstrated metric
(MI2), scalar (MI3), and uniqueness invariance (MI4).
Recall from the cross-cultural comparison that, before metric invariance can actually be
fully assumed, the psychometric modelM4 for the SBS requires a test of the equality of five
pairwise covariances across informants. Both the equality of variances and the equality of resid-
ual covariances are necessarywithin the context of this measurement model. Simultaneously
fixing the factor variances of both groups to 1 and constraining the covariances to be equal
across groups (MI5) did not worsen model fit, so the equivalence of relationships between the
item-pairs across the dyads held (cf. Table 5).
Looking at the freely estimated SBS factor mean difference in MI5, peers’ ratings were set
off by a tiny difference of standardized 0.05 scale points (SE = 0.03, p = .06). Indeed, in terms of
observed scale means, on average peers significantly overestimated, albeit very weakly, how
much targets themselves embraced supernatural beliefs,Ms = 0.32 vs. 0.16, SDs = 2.33 vs. 2.27,
t(627) = 2.54, p< .001, Cohen’s d = 0.07. The final test at the structural level thus concerned
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the equality of factor means. It requires fixing all factor means to 0 (MI6).With the exception
of the notoriously sensitive Δχ2-difference test, no substantial decrease in model fit according
to fit indices was observed (cf. Table 5). Thus, latent supernatural belief levels according to
peer-reports did not systematically differ from self-reports. The full invariance model described
self- and peer-data parsimoniously and accurately (cf. standardizedmodel parameters in Fig
3), thereby supporting Hypothesis 4.
We conclude that peer-reports reflect virtually the same construct as captured by self-
reports. Taking all aspects of structural invariance (e.g., equal factor variances) into account,
peer-ratings have psychometric qualities (e.g., reliability) nearly identical to those of the scores
elicited from the target participants themselves [105]. Consequently, manifest ratings from
both groups can be legitimately compared and establish convergent validity.
Fig 3. Full measurement invariance model between SBS self- and peer-reports.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0164291.g003




Loadings Intercepts Residuals Structure df χ2 Δdf Δχ2 p CFI RMSEA BIC MI
MI1 Configural 142 460.26*** - - - .966 .059 48970 Yes
MI2 Metric × 153 484.19*** 11 21.47 .029 .964 .058 48920 Yes
MI3 Scalar × × 161 528.16*** 8 48.48 < .001 .960 .060 48914 Yes
MI4 Uniqueness × × × 171 536.16*** 10 12.70 .241 .961 .058 48868 Yes
MI5 Variances × × × Cov 178 524.32*** 7 3.70 .814 .963 .055 48832 Yes
MI6 Full × × × Cov, Means 180 535.57*** 2 13.13 .001 .962 .055 48831 Yes
Best-fitting constrained models in bold. Δχ2 refers to Satorra-Bentler scaled-χ2 difference tests. Nself-peer = 642
*** p < .001.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0164291.t005
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Convergent Validity of Self- and Peer-Reports. The zero-order correlations between
manifest self- and peer-reports for each of the ten SBS items ranged from r = .49 to .77 (ps<
.001; cf. Table 3). The strongest consensus emerged for the belief in a high god; the weakest
consensus for the belief in supernatural messengers (i.e., prophets). Aggregating to the level of
SBS mean scores, both informants’ ratings converged strongly, r(627) = .75, p< .001.
However, in a scenario that is not strictly unidimensional, the theoretical nature and origin
of such convergence cannot be inferred from zero-order correlations of manifest variables. Yet
at the latent level of the measurement invariance model, the structural relationships reflect the
correlations among the constructs of interest (Fig 3), the most important being the supernatu-
ral belief factor. In line with Hypothesis 5, the latent self-peer relationship, r(641) = .81, p<
.001, reflected high self-peer agreement on individuals’ supernatural belief levels. Furthermore,
the medium-sized correlation for the method factor for negative items indicated that peers
had, at least, a non-trivial understanding of, if not an intimate knowledge about, targets’ spe-
cific beliefs about negatively-valenced supernatural entities. All available evidence points to
high convergence between self- and peer-ratings of supernatural belief assessed with the SBS.
Furthermore, that the zero-order correlation between self- and peer-SBS scores resembled the
latent correlation highlights the suitability of the SBS composite score as a proxy variable to
analyze belief. At the same time, the less than perfect latent correlations point to people’s limits
of judging other people’s cognitions.
Concurrent validity of SBS scores. Evidence of concurrent validity is given by the SBS’s
prediction of the frequency of three religious behaviors, namely the frequencies of praying,
attending church services, and participating in the ritual of communion, respectively, Pearson-
r = .77, .70, and .68 (ps< .001). Assuming more correctly that these measures were ordinal
level, the rank-correlations amounted to Spearman-ρ = .75, .71, and .69 (ps< .001), yielding
evidence for Hypothesis 6.
The benefit of using the SBS over religious self-categorization, or religious denomination, is
evident from comparing the correlations computed separately for Christians and Atheists/
Agnostics.Whereas a categorical response, say, “Christian” cannot differentiate between fer-
vent and less fervent believers, the variability among Christians is reliably captured by the SBS.
It capably predicted praying, attending church services, and participating in holy communion,
Pearson-r = .60, .60, and .57 (ps< .001) and Spearman-ρ = .54, .60, and .59 (ps< .001). As the
frequency of religious behaviors varied even among self-ascribedAtheists/Agnostics, their level
of supernatural belief could be exploited to predict whether individuals occasionally or never
showed religious activity, r = .53, .17, and .14 (Spearman-ρ = .52, .20, and .16; all ps< .05). Of
course, among this group the public display of religious behavior (church attendance, holy
mass) is range-restricted, limiting the correlation coefficients; yet private religious behavior
(prayer) could nonetheless be inferred from SBS scores, basically as well as for Christians, r =
.53. Thus, the SBS is the first measure capturing personal belief tendencies that predicts how
likely self-declared non-religious people are to pray, although they find themselves outside of
organized forms of religion. If religious people “believewhat they shouldn't” [109], then cer-




The SBS was designed as a flexible, translatable, and cross-culturally applicable measure of
individuals’ tendency to believe in those supernatural entities that have been identified in
anthropology as cross-culturally recurring themes. Hence, the SBS was envisioned to be used
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also cross-religiously. Jong and colleagues [11] provided the first evidence that the SBS was an
essentially unidimensionalmeasure that was useful for testing hypotheses about the psycholog-
ical causes of supernatural belief (see also [22]). Our findings provide the first evidence for the
SBS’s translatability and cross-cultural applicability.
The English and Croatian versions of the SBS enjoy full invariance, though only partially at
the scalar level; yet the degree of noninvariance was almost negligible and hardly detrimental
to scale means. Therefore, SBS scores are (almost) perfectly comparable across the two lan-
guages and may be used in cross-cultural replications of correlational and experimental studies.
However, two specificmanifest items (heaven, souls) are not directly comparable. Despite the
potential usefulness of ranking supernatural belief levels across countries [110, 111], we recom-
mend that in future cross-cultural studies researchers always take care whethermanifest SBS
scores–and supernatural belief in specific entities in particular–can actually be compared across
nations, cultures, or languages; conclusions may be tentatively drawn on a latent level. Also,
with full invariance between self- and peer-ratings, peers constitute as a valid source of infor-
mation about the SBS’s convergent validity. Indeed, our findings support high convergent
validity of SBS scores.
Other Validation Attempts in the Field of Religiosity
Many scholars have conceptualized religiosity as a multi-dimensional construct [112], suggest-
ing that affiliation, behavior, and belief form the integral components, whereas others have
approached its measurement even with single-itemmeasures [113, 114]. Apart from the under-
lying debate about the dimensionality of religiosity, there is no consensus about the adequate
assessment of religiosity [115, 116]. Despite an abundance of scales of religiosity and related
constructs, such as spirituality [50, 51], research on religiosity scales has grossly neglected the
topic of cross-cultural measurement invariance. Some exceptions do exist though.Mathur
[117] observed (partial)measurement invariance when comparing Indian and U.S. samples.
This analysis was based on a six-item scale that claimed to reflect all three aforementioned reli-
giosity components and nonetheless treated religiosity as a unidimensional construct [118].
Another approach to measurement invariance—onmysticism—was based on a comparison of
Christian and non-Christian Chinese participants [119]. This comparison was neither focused
on a religiosity measure proper, nor did the samples involve a cross-cultural comparison.
Recent attempts at establishing cross-cultural invariance for spirituality have been less convinc-
ing; not even the number of factors could be reliably replicated [32]. We underscore the neces-
sity, and at the same time the value, of inspecting cross-cultural measurement invariance of
scales in research on religion.We emphasize that properly constructed and, preferably, unidi-
mensional tests do stand a chance to be applicable in different contexts, and we expect the SBS
to set a standard in this regard.
Due to the miscellaneous nature of many scales, an important development in the cognitive
science of religion is to assess each religiosity component separately, reliably, and validly [19].
The SBS focuses exclusively on the cognitive factor, the belief component, and its cross-cultur-
ally recurring constituents as observed in anthropological research [11]. This scale already
requires an elaborated measurement model to reflect the influence of diverse belief elements
on general belief tendencies. At least among participants with different “Western” cultural
backgrounds, invariance was established cross-culturally. With regard to the difference
between cross-cultural and cross-religious comparisons, the latter may pose a bigger challenge
than when comparing samples from countries with shared influence dominated by a, say,
Christian world-view. Comparisons across heterogeneous populations (such as from India and
the U.S.) or dissimilar dominant religions (say, Hinduism and Christianity)might pose
Cross-Cultural Supernatural Belief
PLOS ONE | DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0164291 October 19, 2016 22 / 31
challenges too. On the optimistic side, the nature of the construct was well-understood by self-
and peer-raters and shared across at least two countries.
Limitations
The current findings are not without their own challenges and limitations. First, we estimated
linear relationships betweenmanifest and latent variables in the context of nested data, but up
to now these models have only been applied to longitudinal data nested within subjects, or to
dyadic data nested within dyads (couples, twins), not to dyadic data nested within the targets
to-be-rated (self-peer).Despite forerunners, the conceptual novelty of our approach comes at
the expense of prior experiencewith it, especially with regard to MI-tests. Strictly speaking,
CFA models are suitable for continuous variables and should not be applied to polytomous
variables (4- or 5-point Likert scales) lightly. As the answering format of the SBS supplies nine
graded steps, we are not concerned about the approximation by normal theory (cf. [70–72,
117]). CFA with ML estimation is relatively robust already when used with merely five ordinal
response categories [120]. Given the fit of the initial measurement model in each set of self-
and peer data, it appears unlikely that combining the two models into one, while adding depen-
dencies for the dyadic structure, invalidated our attempt to establish MI. Despite a priori con-
cerns that DGCFA might not fit well due to model complexity, there was no indication of
misfit, or that dependent self- and peer-assessments differed at any MI level. By contrast, com-
paring two independent groups with MGCFA did detect two unequal intercepts. Dyadic data
raise the power to detect differences (cf. paired and unpaired t-tests), so the fact that MI held
for self- vs. peer-data is reassuring for the validity of this DGCFA approach.
Another concern is the possibility of “stereotypic accuracy”, a measurement artifact known
to sometimes inflate correlations between people even when (and possibly especially when)
they have little knowledge about each other [121]. When both raters do not describe the target,
but an image of people in general, each rater will contribute to an “accurate” description in the
sense that they converge on a common stereotype, inflating the inter-rater agreement. The cor-
relation may reflect self-peer agreement that is slightly biased upward due to a holistic interpre-
tation of how much an individual conforms to a stereotypical Croatian.
An idiosyncratic version of stereotypic accuracy is the “self-based heuristic” [122]. When
peers rate targets on aspects that are difficult to observe and evaluate, they tend to fill any gaps
by projecting from their own personality. As participants selected significant others who knew
them well, we may have accidentally run into dyads that did not only share knowledge on
ratees’ beliefs, but who shared religious affiliations, belongingness to religious communities,
and supernatural beliefs too. Consequently, the convergence of self- and peer-reportsmay
partly reflect similarity-based agreement among well-acquainted people [123]. Reassuringly,
this has been a negligible concern in previous research, at least in studies on broad personality
trait ratings [124]. Nevertheless, the case of the SBS is quite specific and, unlike Funder and col-
leagues, our study design cannot empirically determine the size of such an effect if it existed.
To control for similarity-basedprojections future research might use round-robin designs to
disentangle different source effects [66, 125].
From a methodological perspective, our design confounded cultures and languages. Any
differences attributable to differences in the religious background of samples could equally
likely be attributed to a language issue between the original and its translation. These aspects
cannot be disentangled with the currently available samples and study design. Yet, the impor-
tant message here is that the quality of translation achieved was good, and the different cultural
backgrounds were not detrimental to adopting the same measurement model. Metric invari-
ance, not to mention scalar invariance, is a requirement that too often is difficult to satisfy in
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cross-cultural research [45, 126]. Aside from two item intercepts, the SBS assessed a highly sim-
ilar construct with equal reliability in both countries, namely the general tendency to believe in
the supernatural, evident in various religions around the globe. Thus, our findings indirectly
support the quality achieved for the Croatian translation.
Outlook and Conclusion
Given measurement invariance, the underlying latent variables related to the observed item
answers in like manner for Croatian self- and peer-raters, as well as for Croatians and New
Zealanders. Comparingmanifest item or scale means across the two cultures is possible, except
for the items “souls” and “heaven” [45]. Practically speaking, the degree of noninvariance was
small so that scale means approximated the information contained in latent factor means. Still,
any theoretical questions should ideally be taken to the latent level. Only the full SBS measure-
ment model captures the essence of supernatural belief free from secondary factors and accom-
modates different intercepts so that factor scores can be legitimately compared.
While it was not of theoretical importance for us to determine how much the supernatural
belief tendencies differed across Croatia and New Zealand, future researchers may find such a
comparison useful, especially when they explore religious backgrounds at the global scale,
which may differ more strongly than the two cultures at hand. The measurement invariance
situation may always look brighter for similar religious contexts or same-language settings.
Our findings do not yet speak to the wider generalizability across religions.
Still, our results make us optimistic that many more correlational and experimental ques-
tions can be addressed with the SBS with confidence.We advise more scrutiny in the future,
particularly in wider cross-cultural and cross-religious comparisons. All in all, we encourage
others to use the SBS in a variety of contexts, and thus explore the utility of the SBS’s specific
focus on the belief component as compared to religious commitment in a broader sense [127].
With the SBS’s help, we expectmore light to be shed on the mystery of humans’ religious
thinking and supernatural belief.
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